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Abstract
Background: Allocation of adequate healthcare facilities is one of the most important factors that public health policy-
makers consider when preparing for infectious disease outbreaks. Negative pressure isolation rooms (NPIRs) are 
one of the critical resources for control of infectious respiratory diseases, such as the novel coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19) outbreak. However, there is insufficient attention to efficient allocation of NPIR-equipped hospitals. 
Methods: We aim to explore any insufficiency and spatial disparity of NPIRs in South Korea in response to infectious 
disease outbreaks based on a simple analytic approach. We examined the history of installing NPIRs in South Korea 
between the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003 and the Middle East respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus (MERS-Cov) in 2015 to evaluate the allocation process and spatial distribution of NPIRs across the country. 
Then, for two types of infectious diseases (a highly contagious disease like COVID-19 vs. a hospital-based transmission 
like MERS-Cov), we estimated the level of disparity between NPIR capacity and demand at the sub-regional level in 
South Korea by applying the two-step floating catchment area (2SFCA) method.
Results: Geospatial information system (GIS) mapping reveals a substantial shortage and misallocation of NPIRs, 
indicating that the Korean government should consider a simple but evidence-based spatial method to identify the areas 
that need NPIRs most and allocate funds wisely. The 2SFCA method suggests that, despite the recent addition of NPIRs 
across the country, there should still be more NPIRs regardless of the spread pattern of the disease. It also illustrates 
high levels of regional disparity in allocation of those facilities in preparation for an infectious disease, due to the lack of 
evidence-based approach.
Conclusion: These findings highlight the importance of evidence-based decision-making processes in allocating public 
health facilities, as misallocation of facilities could impede the responsiveness of the public health system during an 
epidemic. This study provides some evidence to be used to allocate the resources for NPIRs, the urgency of which is 
heightened in the face of rapidly evolving threats from the novel COVID-19 outbreak. 
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Background
Preparation and response for infectious disease outbreaks is 
one of the most important roles for public health authorities. 
The increasing emergence of virulent infectious diseases due 
to globalization and environmental changes is further cause 
for concern,1 as is evidenced in the coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19) outbreak originating in Wuhan, China and 
leading to a global pandemic in 2020.2 Prior to the COVID-19 
pandemic, which is still ongoing at the time of this study, 
South Korea had experienced three notable infectious 
disease outbreaks in recent history: severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) in 2003, H1N1 (influenza A) in 2009, 
and Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-
CoV) in 2015.3 In 2015, the MERS-CoV became an outbreak 
of concern because of the uncertainty of presentation and 
management across countries.4 The determinants of public 
health and socioeconomic outcomes of MERS-CoV have 
been extensively explored and investigated by the global 
community.5-7 In the regional comparison study of MERS-
CoV, the strength of the public health system and effectiveness 
of outbreak response is one of the critical factors in variation 
of MERS-CoV outcomes.1 In an infectious disease outbreak, 
central or regional government agencies implement a variety 
of response policies and programs such as immunization, 
screening, and quarantine in order to limit the spread of 
disease.8 Among these policies, preparing sufficient numbers 
of infection control facilities in hospitals is a key factor to 
reduce disease transmission in a country.9,10
For infectious respiratory diseases, one key resource for 
infection control are negative pressure isolation rooms 
(NPIRs). NPIRs prevent the transmission of airborne 
infection by lowering air pressure in the isolation room relative 
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Implications for policy makers
• In an infectious disease outbreak, government agencies should prepare sufficient numbers of infection control facilities in hospitals, such as 
negative pressure isolation rooms (NPIRs), to reduces airborne disease transmission.
• Allocating resources for NPIRs should be based on evidence on spatial distribution of disease risks and demand for the facility, rather than 
administrative convenience or political dynamics.
• NPIR allocation in South Korea is both suboptimal and inadequate for the infectious disease risk, which is particularly concerning in light of 
novel outbreaks such as coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19).
• To set criteria for a more effective allocation of NPIRs, systematic and scientific mechanisms for distributing resources and optimizing coverage 
should be developed and adopted by the national authorities for better public health outcomes.
• Even a simple method of spatial allocation (ie, two-step floating catchment area, 2SFCA) can be used to discover the lack of NPIR facilities and 
the locations where new NPIRs need to be established. 
Implications for the public
The increasing emergence of virulent infectious diseases is cause for concern, as is evidenced in the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak 
originating in Wuhan, China and leading to a global pandemic in 2020. Despite the importance of negative pressure isolation rooms (NPIRs) in 
preventing the transmission of airborne infection, NPIR allocation in South Korea remains insufficient. A national plan for building NPIRs was not 
completed due to budgetary constraints and a lack of political interest, even after a series of outbreaks. South Korea needs to have more NPIRs and 
allocate them more wisely in order to respond to novel infectious disease outbreaks such as COVID-19. Citizens should ensure that the government 
conducts evidence-based allocation of NPIRs and other health facilities, rather than be driven by administrative convenience or other political 
factors.
Key Messages 
to hospital corridors or other rooms.9,11 If NPIRs are built 
with several isolation functions (such as negative pressure 
under continuous electronic monitoring, HEPA-filtered air, 
and separate bathrooms and anterooms), the possibility of 
contagion of respiratory infectious diseases become almost 
zero. The cost of NPIRs, however, is quite high. Private 
hospitals hesitate to build them because the financial returns 
of new NPIR facilities are not beneficial.12 Due to the high-
cost and relatively low-returns, it is argued that NPIRs are 
public goods that governments should provide to increase the 
level of preparation for virulent infectious disease outbreaks.10 
Predicting and forecasting infectious disease are very 
difficult problems in public health planning due to the 
many complex factors affecting disease spread, notably 
human behavior.13,14 In one recent incident in the COVID-19 
outbreak in South Korea, a religious gathering was a catalyst 
of dramatic increase of confirmed cases (they represented 
almost 80% of confirmed cases at the end of February, 2020). If 
the first step for preparation of epidemic is surveillance, then 
the second step is to mitigate rapid transmission through the 
timely isolation and treatment of confirmed cases to prevent 
community-acquired infection.15 This requires preparedness 
and appropriate allocation of healthcare facilities. A 
government, therefore, should consider the allocation of 
health facilities in which confirmed patients can be promptly 
isolated and treated. Allocation decisions should be made by 
local population density and facility capacity in pessimistic 
scenarios. 
This study proposes that a simple spatial approach to 
allocation can highlight gaps in preparation. The goal of 
this study is to evaluate the allocation process and spatial 
distribution of NPIR hospitals across South Korea since the 
year of 2000 and the implications for future allocation. The 
paper proposes evidence-based spatial allocation methods 
which can indicate specific locations where the central 
government’s funds should be allocated to install more NPIRs. 
Using the case of 2015 MERS-CoV outbreak, the paper models 
the specific sites of need in South Korea, the urgency of which 
is heightened in the face of threats from the novel COVID-19 
outbreak. In addition to facility allocation, of course, many 
other factors determine the effectiveness of outbreak response. 
In this context, South Korea is a good research subject because 
it has experienced several infectious disease outbreaks, one of 
which the country successfully contained (SARS) and others 
of which it was largely unsuccessful (MERS) in containing. 
Through the analysis of historical experiences of SARS, 
H1N1, and MERS, we scrutinize the chronological process 
of NPIR allocation in South Korea and evaluate the impact 
of health resource misallocation. Our study warns of NPIR 
allocation driven by political convenience and suggests a 
simple approach to evidence-based analysis with limited data. 
2015 MERS-CoV Outbreak in South Korea
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, MERS-CoV was the 
most severe outbreak in Korea in recent history. Over 12 000 
people were isolated for MERS-CoV, and 38 deaths out of 186 
confirmed cases were attributed to the disease (representing 
a mortality rate of 20.4%).16 The number of MERS-CoV cases 
in South Korea surpassed every other country in the world 
except for Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the outbreak had a 
significant economic impact on the country decreasing the 
economic growth rate by 0.5 percentage points, representing 
a $10 billion loss.17 
Nearly all MERS-CoV infections in South Korea were 
linked to exposure in hospitals which hosted suspected or 
confirmed MERS cases.4,18 Forty-four percent of confirmed 
cases were admitted or treated in the same hospital with a 
confirmed case, 38% of them were either family members or 
visitors, and 17% were medical staff.19 Thus, a key concern 
arising from the tragic MERS outbreak was the lack of special 
healthcare facilities such as NPIRs.7,19 
Although the importance of NPIRs has been revived during 
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the COVID-19 outbreak,20 there has been no scientific study 
that assesses the adequacy of spatial allocation of NPIRs 
in South Korea. In 2003, Taiwan had a total of 764 NPIRs 
when experiencing SARS. Taiwanese NPIR facilities were 
appropriately equipped with HEPA-filtered air, negative 
pressure under continuous electronic monitoring, separate 
bathrooms, and so on. In the outbreak, The Taiwan Center 
for Disease Control ensured the first 23 possible patients were 
treated and cared in these NPIRs in 15 hospitals as successfully 
prevented transmission unlike other nearby countries where 
NPIRs were not commonly available in hospitals.21 Also, 
a study on the allocation of NPIRs in Japan indicated the 
need to increase the number of NPIRs because nurses in 
hospitals without NPIRs were more likely to be exposed to 
latent tuberculosis infection after the 2011 Great East Japan 
Earthquake.22 
The primary recommendation of the White Report,23 
published after the MERS-CoV outbreak by the Korean 
Ministry of Health and Welfare, was to increase the number 
of isolation health facilities like NPIRs. Indeed, many studies 
have concluded that the Korean government should prepare 
more effective isolated health facilities across the country 
following the shortages revealed by MERS-CoV.7,19,24 Although 
systematic planning of isolation health facilities may not 
generate immediate benefit due to uncertain characteristics 
of novel contagious outbreaks, it is worthwhile to assess the 
existing distribution of such facilities nationwide and identify 
underprovided areas needing policy attention. 
Evidence-Based Health Resource Allocation
Health resource allocation is a key administrative decision 
for governments, which would suggest that institutional 
structures should guide decision-making through established 
processes. Yet, public policy decisions in fact occur in the 
context of uncertainty in multiple streams of problems, 
policy, and politics.25,26 Political power structures are often 
a primary factor in policy-making27,28 and decision-making 
for health resource allocations are frequently determined 
by administrative convenience and political dynamics.29 
In contrast to the uncertainties of politics, evidence-based 
decision-making methods employ a systematic decision-
making approach, utilizing technology and information 
to optimize choices. Evidence-based decision-making can 
improve equity in resource allocation and health facility 
accessibility by relying on measurable knowledge, rather than 
political power structures, to determine in health resource 
allocation. As a result, this approach can increase the level of 
social welfare and the degree of health equity.18,27 Moreover, 
decision-makers can be held accountable for health facility 
allocations, which can increase public acceptance of resource 
allocation decisions.27 The World Health Organization 
(WHO) guidance for health facility allocation promotes this 
structured process30 and many developed countries have 
begun to adopt the evidence-based methods in public health 
facility allocation and in health policy decision-making.26,31 
Despite broad benefits, in practice, on-going political and 
economic pressures prevent many countries from successfully 
incorporating evidence-based facility allocation models. 
When a country experiences an outbreak of an infectious 
disease, the government may consider building special 
healthcare facilities. In such an emergency, political dynamics 
often lead to instant decisions to allocate or establish additional 
healthcare facilities. Because these decisions are not carefully 
weighed in a broader context, they often increase inequality 
in resource allocation among hospitals, and worsen equity 
of access to healthcare. Particularly in developing countries, 
politicized health allocation has led to facility numbers and 
spatial allocations to be inefficient and intensify existing 
inequalities.32 Many countries, including South Korea, have 
found it difficult to adopt the evidence-based methods for 
health facility allocation.26 
Allocation Process for NPIR Funds in South Korea 
In South Korea, allocating healthcare resources is the focus 
of substantial public policy attention, particularly around 
perceived risks from emerging infectious diseases such as 
coronaviruses. However, national allocation has not been 
conducted with optimization models, but rather steered 
by political factors, local resources, or administrative 
convenience. NPIRs are a specific healthcare resource 
identified in the national plan of South Korea.33 The 2015 
national plan targeted the number of a single room NPIRs 
to increase by nearly 100 units. In 2016, 19 hospitals across 
the country had a total of 119 NPIR beds, and the central 
government of South Korea committed to subsidizing 23.4 
billion won (equivalent to US$22 million) per NPIR that a 
hospital newly builds. 
The national plan for NPIR creation in South Korea 
details the process of subsidy award for NPIR construction.33 
Hospitals with existing NPIRs have priority for receiving the 
subsidies, but other hospitals may apply only if they meet 
specific regulation requirements pertaining to: size, type, 
number of hospital medical staff, other ancillary facilities 
in the hospital, and infectious disease experience. Once a 
hospital meeting the aforementioned requirements applies 
for NPIR grants, local governments of the hospitals review 
these applications, attach recommendations, and send these 
applications to a central government agency, the Korean 
Center for Disease Control (KCDC). When an application 
is selected by the KCDC, funding and other resources are 
granted to local governments, which distribute them to the 
hospitals. Figure 1 depicts this process.
Although this decision-making process is efficient and 
avoids many social conflicts, it is likely to result in unequal 
resource distribution. First, the resource allocation process 
is a merit-based system. Because wealthy hospitals often 
have better healthcare outcomes, and human and material 
resources, they also have a higher chance of receiving NPIR 
funding, exacerbating the problem of unbalanced resource 
distribution. Second, while the current process is convenient 
for decision-makers, it gives them no opportunity to consider 
the outcomes of an allocation or test the implications of their 
decisions. Finally, the direct beneficiaries of NPIRs are not 
considered in the resource allocation process. The current 
process assumes that hospitals with better facilities will have 
more respiratory disease patients. Accordingly, large hospitals, 
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able to satisfy all other requirements, have better chances to 
obtain NPIR resources. Within this context, comparing spatial 
distribution of NPIRs with those of MERS-CoV patients and 
population size can reveal a potential mismatch between 
supply and demand of public health resources and highlight 
the importance of evidence-based decision-making processes 
to public health policy. 
Methods
Data
The demographic data including populations of the years 
of 2009 and 2015 for South Korea were obtained from the 
Korea Statistical Information Service website (http://kosis.
kr/eng). The infectious disease patient and hospital data are 
open source and available in the disease web statistics system 
organized by the KCDC. Other geospatial information system 
(GIS) related data, including shapefiles for Korea Topographic 
Map, were available on ArcGIS websites (http://www.arcgis.
com/home/item.html?id=e220cddfd0104a20b49a05da1a89a
ece). The data are aggregated at the level of 250 municipalities 
in South Korea (si-gun-gu), and each of these municipalities 
serve as a unit of analysis of this study. The patient records and 
population data for both influenza A (2009) and MERS-CoV 
(2015) were used for creating maps of the historical changes 
of patients and NPIR allocations. The SARS patient data were 
excluded because of very small number of cases (n = 3) and 
no mortality from the disease in South Korea. However, the 
SARS outbreak brought awareness of NPIR facilities for the 
Korean government and made it start to install NPIRs in 
major hospitals. Table shows the descriptive information of 
population size and number of Influenza A and MERS-CoV 
cases by municipalities in South Korea.
Analytic Methods
To explore and diagnose the current allocation of NPIRs in 
South Korea, we used a GIS approach to assess allocations, 
coverage, and disparities of NPIR facilities. First, a series 
of mapping (chronological GIS mapping) was conducted 
to illustrate the chronological variation of NPIR allocation 
throughout major infectious disease outbreaks since 2003 
when South Korea experienced SARS. In this analysis, 
we discover the role of political factors in non-optimized 
allocation of health resources, creating a mismatch between 
health facilities and needs. Second, we used a two-step floating 
catchment area (2SFCA) method to measure recent NPIR 
coverage for different outbreak scenarios, based on patient 
records and population data. The 2SFCA method permits 
estimation of the level of disparity between NPIR capacity 
and confirmed MERS cases or population distribution. 
This analysis has the advantage of measuring the coverage 
of facilities using buffers, taking into account healthcare 
accessibility and spatial decomposition.34 The basic 2SFCA 
method consists of two steps assessing healthcare access: 
supply and then demand of health facilities. In the first step, a 
set of travel time from a health service provider, calculated by 
road distance and average driving speed, is used to aggregate 
the population that a supplier can reach. Then, a provider-
to-population ratio is computed. Thus, if the ratio is 1 then 
the total population can reach the healthcare provider within 
the given driving distance. The second step is summing all 
provider-to-population ratios of health facilities within 
a certain driving distance from a particular population 
center, which we defined as spatial accessibility index. The 
mathematical expression for these is as follows. In the result 
maps, the values of FiA are depicted. 





Step 2: 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 =∑𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗 
 
Where: 
Sj: Medical capacity at each provider j
Rj: Provider-to-population ratio at each provider j
Pk: Population (or demand) site k
do: Travel threshold
Distancek,j: Travel time between k and j
F
iA : Spatial accessibility index of each population (or demand) 
site i
This method has the advantage of producing results that are 
easily understood and interpreted, using a relatively simple 
method with limited data. The buffer zones visually show 
Figure 1. The Process of NPIR Resource Allocation in South Korea. 
Abbreviation: NPIR, negative pressure isolation room.
Table. Descriptive Statistics of Each Dataset
Dataset Mean SD Min Max N
2009 Population size by municipalities 198 753 155 587 10 168 867 678 250
2015 Population size by municipalities 206 117 161 973 10 153 848 987 250
Number of influenza A cases by municipalities (2009) 2806 2673 48 16 272 250
Number of MERS-CoV cases by municipalities (2015) 0.73 2.48 0 29 250
Abbreviations: SD, standard deviation; MERS-CoV, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus.
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the boundaries of each health facility’s capacity, considering 
the interaction between supply and demand. Our approach 
uses a simple method of 2SFCA rather than an enhanced 
one because of data limitations and capacity constraints 
facing infectious disease personnel. The method has some 
disadvantages, including the assumption that it is equally easy 
to access all providers within the designated drive time, not 
taking account of traffic. Travel time in urban and rural areas 
are also assumed to be the same. Furthermore, the method 
is concerned with only one type of transportation. Moreover, 
in an outbreak, medical personnel can transfer to hospitals 
where infected cases are being treated. This study uses only 
bed numbers in NPIRs to illustrate how insufficient NPIR 
resources are across the country in preparedness for the next 
infectious disease outbreak. While more complex versions of 
2SFCA exist,35,36 these are not needed to conclude there are 
insufficient and poorly allocated NPIRs. The application of a 
simple method with easily available data conveys the value of 
simple analytical approaches for baseline assessments in low 
resource settings, which has been known to enhance the level 
of policy adoption and implementation.37,38 With the 2SFCA 
method, we also conducted a sensitivity analysis of the need 
for NPIRs in pessimistic and optimistic scenarios based on 
the travel distance of suspected patients from 10 miles to 
40 miles (roughly, one-hour driving). We also evaluated 
the conditions of two different types of infectious diseases; 
MERS-like hospital-based transmission (using the reported 
MERS case data in 2015) vs. highly contagious disease like 
COVID-19 occurring through social interactions (suggesting 
COVID-19 demand for NPIRs will be in equal proportion for 
the population).
Results
Descriptive Analysis and Mapping
Figure 2 illustrates the changing location of NPIRs over 
time in South Korea, from the SARS outbreak in 2003 to the 
MERS outbreak in 2015. As shown, there were no confirmed 
SARS deaths, but the SARS outbreak brought awareness 
of NPIR facilities in the country for the first time, and the 
Korean government began to install NPIRs in major hospitals 
across the country.39 However, the location of NPIRs was 
unbalanced, and disproportionately concentrated in the 
western areas. Most resources were clustered around the 
Seoul metropolis, the capital of the country and home to one 
fourth of the national population. The size of the red circles 
in Figure 2 indicates the capacity of NPIRs. Meanwhile, 
two other areas also received funds for NPIR facilities, but 
government documents give no explanation of how these 
places were chosen. After the influenza A (H1N1) outbreak 
in 2009, the Korean government increased the number of 
NPIRs, as shown in the third map in Figure 2. Some hospitals 
in the west increased NPIR capacity, and new NPIRs were 
built in eastern areas, resulting in NPIRs being more evenly 
spread throughout the country.
Specifically, Figure 3a shows that NPIRs were not well 
allocated for the influenza A outbreak in 2009. The color 
gradation in the figure represents the ratio of confirmed 
influenza A patients to the population. It appears that more 
NPIRs were needed in the high prevalence areas, such as in 
the eastern and the southeastern areas, while NPIRs were 
concentrated in the west. Even in within the high-density 
Seoul area (enlarged in figure), NPIRs placement was not 
aligned with need, as shown in Figure 3a. After expanding 
NPIR capacity, the MERS-CoV outbreak occurred in 2015. 
Although it appears in Figure 3b that NPIRs were more evenly 
distributed compared to the past, there were still some areas 
with mismatches between the NPIR capacity and MERS-CoV 
cases. The central regions had insufficient facilities while 
the southern areas had excess facilities. As found in Figure 
3b inset of the Seoul area, most MERS cases occurred in the 
south of the area, yet the NPIRs are primarily located north 
of the urban area.
This GIS mapping approach suggests a substantial 
mismatch of allocation of NPIRs, indicating that the Korean 
government should consider an evidence-based spatial 
method to allocate NPIRs funds based on a specific pattern of 
infectious disease and existing resource capacity. This study 
provides some evidence to be used to allocate the resources of 
Figure 2. Chronological Allocation Changes of NPIR Hospitals in South Korea From 2003 to 2015. Abbreviations: NPIR, negative pressure isolation room; MERS-
CoV, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus; SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome.
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health facilities based on population and case distribution and 
capacity of health facilities.
Sensitivity Analysis With Two-Step Floating Catchment Area 
Method
To show the results of 2SFCA analyses, two types of infectious 
diseases (a highly contagious disease like COVID-19 vs. a 
hospital-based transmission like MERS-CoV) were used with 
two scenarios based on a travel distance to NPIR hospitals. 
Figure 4 shows the 2SFCA maps for the outbreak of a highly 
contagious disease, assuming that the whole population has 
an equal probability of infection. Figure 4a indicates that most 
areas in the country are not covered by the NPIR buffers of 
10 miles. Even in the optimistic scenario shown in Figure 4b, 
which uses 40 miles driving distance, uncovered areas still 
exist in the east. We also note the magnitude of coefficients 
of proportions. Most areas have coefficients of less than 0.013, 
which implies that only 13 of the 1 million people in the 
region can be covered effectively. The analysis highlights the 
massive shortage of NPIRs for this type of disease.
Concerning another type of outbreak of a less contagious 
(but high mortality) disease like MERS, similar patterns of 
NPIR facility coverage are found in Figure 5. In Figure 5a, 
even though the magnitudes of ratio coefficient are greater 
than the first case, there are still areas without access to 
NPIR facilities. Moreover, the Seoul metropolitan area is 
the only place to be well covered by the NPIRs hospitals. 
The magnitude of coefficients of 2SFCA is also concerning. 
Figure 3. A Mismatch Map of the Ratio of Influenza A (H1N1), MERS, and NPIR Distribution. Abbreviations: NPIR, negative pressure isolation room; MERS-CoV, 
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus.
Figure 4. 2SFCA Maps (Case 1. A Highly Contagious Disease Like COVID-19). Abbreviations: 2SFCA, two-step floating catchment area; COVID-19, coronavirus 
disease 2019; NPIRs, negative pressure isolation rooms.
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In the case of MERS in 2015, only 0.01~0.04% of regional 
populations could receive benefits from the current NPIR 
facilities. Thus, it may well be that most people would not have 
access to NPIRs even within the Seoul Metropolitan area, if 
there were a dense concentration of cases. In the optimistic 
scenario with 40-mile buffers shown in Figure 5b, while NPIR 
locations better cover the country, there still are some areas 
without coverage in the central southern region and the west 
and east coasts. Moreover, a longer distance assumption for 
service implies contagion risk of diseases while transferring 
patients. In additions, the coefficient of FiA  is not big enough 
to cover high density areas in South Korea either, so more 
facilities should be allocated in the areas.
Since the MERS outbreak, South Korean government 
has increased the number of NPIRs. As of 2018, there were 
163 NPIRs installed in 29 hospitals across the country. We 
tested the allocation of NPIRs with the 2018 population in 
the context of a highly contagious disease in which the entire 
population has equal possibility of exposure. As shown 
in Figure 6, the overall spatial coverage expanded, but the 
magnitude of coefficients of NPIRs per capita coverage did not 
sufficiently increase compared to past allocation, particularly 
in a pessimistic scenario (Figure 6a). This finding indicates 
that there should still be more NPIRs across the country to 
be able to respond effectively to highly contagious disease 
like COVID-19. New NPIR resources need to be allocated in 
regions where there is currently low accessibility to NPIRs. 
Due to the difficulty in predicting disease spread patterns 
and the scope of risk, adequate funding and resources may 
need to be allocated to provide sufficient number of NPIRs in 
readiness for pessimistic scenarios.40
Discussion and Conclusion
This study finds that NPIR allocation in South Korea is 
both suboptimal and inadequate for infectious disease risk, 
something that is particularly concerning in light of novel 
Figure 5. 2SFCA Maps (Case 2: A Hospital-Based Transmission Like MERS-CoV). Abbreviations: 2SFCA, two-step floating catchment area; MERS-CoV, Middle East 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus; NPIRs, negative pressure isolation rooms.
Figure 6. Two-step Floating Catchment Maps With Updated Data in 2018. Abbreviation: NPIRs, negative pressure isolation rooms.
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outbreaks such as COVID-19. In 2003, as a reaction to South 
Asian countries suffering from SARS, the Korean government 
established a strategic plan for infectious disease. However, 
despite the severity of the SARS pandemic, the government 
did not complete the plan until experiencing the severe 
infectious disease outbreak of MERS in 2015. During the 
period between the H1N1 and MERS outbreaks, the national 
plan for building NPIRs was not fully implemented, due to 
budgetary constraints and a lack of political interest. This issue 
remains unresolved during current COVID-19 pandemic.
This study reveals that South Korea lacks the requisite 
number of NPIR beds required to respond to disease 
outbreaks. There are three aspects to this shortage. First, 
based on the analysis of past cases, the absolute number of 
NPIRs is likely to be insufficient to care for all confirmed 
cases in an epidemic. Secondly, the allocation of NPIR 
resources to hospitals has not matched the regional ratio of 
patients to population in past pandemics. Finally, our analysis 
discloses significant and intensifying mismatching of NPIRs 
to confirmed cases of contagious diseases at the national level. 
Our conclusions strongly support the position that South 
Korea should conduct evidence-based allocation rather than 
be driven by crises of current epidemics and other political 
scenarios. To set criteria for a more effective allocation of 
NPIRs, systematic mechanisms for optimizing coverage 
should be developed and adopted by the national authorities. 
Of course, evidence-based policy-making will not be a 
panacea and may not appear feasible in the midst of rapidly 
evolving threats such as COVID-19, but a systematic 
and scientific process will lead to better public health 
outcomes. The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the many 
unanticipated or uncontrollable challenges which occur in 
responding to a novel and widespread disease. During a crisis, 
all types of systems, including physical, social, technical, and 
political will be tested. What our analysis suggests is that there 
are tangible preparations that can be made, in spite of the 
unknowns. One of these is infrastructure, namely the NPIRs, 
which are often costly and seemingly underutilized during 
normal times, but are essential during emergencies. Such 
facilities, like public goods generally, will be underprovided 
without good leadership and management during normal 
planning processes, rather than during emergencies. While 
we must respond to crises as best as our institutions are able, 
we also need to learn and strengthen our institutions beyond 
one crisis and before another.
Although we argue for the value of a simple spatial analytical 
approach which could be easily applied in situations of 
limited resources and data, this study has limitations in that 
is not designed to predict the occurrence of cases of highly 
contagious diseases.13 The assumption of using the population 
distribution as a proxy for potential risk groups may not be 
appropriate or sufficient for predicting demand of NPIRs 
in response to outbreaks. Socio-economic factors in local 
communities such as mobility, a level of social development, 
and types of social interactions need to be considered in 
analytic models for better prediction. In addition, our 
estimation of distribution for future outbreaks assumes 
uniform access to the nearest NPIR health facilities when 
using the 2SFCA model, which may fail to incorporate other 
characteristics of access such as forms of transportation. The 
limitations, however, do not undermine our conclusion of the 
need for more and better distributed facilities. For country-
level planning, a simple approach suggests substantial need 
and suboptimal allocation which should be better addressed 
in the policy-making process. However, future studies should 
incorporate all of these factors into more advanced methods, 
such as an enhanced 2SFCA34 or multi-modal 2SFCA.35
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